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THE MARCH OF WAR
WAR IN THE PACIFIC
(AUgll.8t 7, 1942, to October 15, 1944)
There i" II certain ruel/lblan~llbet"'elln Ih. Pacijk W"r arid Ihe ft'a.r i,. F.·urope.
/" both ca"ell t"~re '...'" ot Jlrilt II ...rpid, ,,;ga,lJir apaMion of eM .pM" oj power
of tire .4n'" , cOllplerl 'rit}, l'omparalivdy .mall kJMu: Ihi. tDaII followed by a .low
rdrOf/ruilive deve/opmcrtl mremely co.'ly for the Alliu. Wll Ml<e reporl«J o'~ the
corly Japurteilfl cictorie6 in tlte Pacific i,~ formflr' iuuu of th... magluine. TM follolc.
,,,g a"idll deal.. wilh Iltll Allied cQurlUro.lfenllil~, which lHgafl em AugtI", 7, J942.
a"d ha. rwclted iu di"uJ.I: iu tile battle for Ihe Philippt1IU.-K.M.
THE SOLOlJONS
ON August 7, 1942, American marineslanded on the Solomon island of
Guadalcanal-wbich the Japanese bad
occupied in May-and on the neighboring,
unoccupied island of Tulagi. This thrust at
the Japanese po8ition in the Solomons was
quito logical, for this was the southeastern-
most point reached by the Japanese, which
placed them in the immediate vicinity of-
t,he most important American sea. lane in
the Pacific, leading from California via
Hawaii to Australia.
Although violent ami sanguinary fighting
broke out on GuadalcanaJ itself at the
moment of landing, the real battle for the
Solomons took place at sea and in the air.
Both opponents bad to feud the battle on
the island with troops, weapons, and pro-
visions, and the fleets of transports reo
quired for this purpose needed strong pro-
uoction. The Americans especially, being
the invaders, had to brillg up aU their
material across the tlea, while the Japane8e
had been able to lay in supplies during the
months they had spent on the island. But
the Japanese, too, tlent additional troops to
Guadalcanal during the autumn.
The following battles, a mighty acoom-
paniment to the land battles on Gundalcanal,
took place at sea and in tho air:
1l!t Solomon Battle Au;:;. R. 1942
2nd ..,. , .....•, 2.& n
Wmtp Buttle •.................. '~(·I't. I;') ..
Savo.. .. Oct. 10 ..
Santa 'ruz Battle ("Battle of the
South Pacific") .. 211 ..
3rd Solomon Battle No\'. 12·1 ..
Night battle off Lunga Point. Nov. 30 ..
Battle olf Rennell .J'ln. 29. 1943
.. Ysabel . . . . . . . . . .. fo·l!b. 1·7 "
In these battles the Allies suffered far
greater 1088C8 than the Japaneee. It seema
that the Japanese held two trump carda
during those encounters: first of all, their
air arm, agaiD8t which the American Fleet
was at that time not yet protected to the
same extent as was later to be the case;
and secondly, the long and careful training
of the Japanese Fleet -for night fighting.
On February 9, 1943, Guadalcanal was
evacuated by the Japanese although, as was
later revealed, not entirelv. A few small
Japanese forces remained on the island and
are still carrying on guerrilla warfare.
With the conquest of Guadalcanal began
the American process of island-hopping,
which was to last for one year. Island
after island, from south to north, the Solo-
mon chain was conquered with heavy 1088C8.
The landings took place as follows:
RU8llell Feb. 21. 1943
Rendova ........................•J"lie 30 "
New Georgia July 7 "
&bi&ll8.........................." •• ••
Vangunu " 28 ..
Bau Aug. I ..
Gizo .. 12 "
VoIla LavoJla .. 16 ..
Kolombangara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 23 ..
Arundel Sept. 11, 1943
Ysabol •.........................Oct. a ..
Mono •...........................•• 2t.5 ••
J30ugainviUe (Ill. 'forokina Point) Nov. I "
,. <at Hamon) 2 ..
Mori 1I ..
Cboi.leul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..•• ~ ..
Green Islands , "'~eb. 14. 10..
The accompaniment to this island-hopping
were the air and naval battles:
Battle 01 San Cristobal F'ou. 17. 1~3
Air battle over RlJII8eU. . . . . . . . . . .. Apr. 1 ..
Battle off F'lorida ..•............. 7"
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Damngtd
5 oircr'Lft carriers
" battleships
2tJ cruisei'll
21 destroyers
13 transports
20 other units
Night bat tlo of Kula Gulf. .••.••... July 7. 1943
.. .. off Kolombangara ...• .. 12 ..
Baule off BougaiO\'ilIe Oct. 31·Nov. 4 ..
In the air there was hardly a pause be-
tWt,'en battles. It was less a mat1:er of
supporting the troops fighting on the ground
than of ga,ining as many airfields as possible
for one's own side and destroying the enemy's.
Tho longer the fight for the Solomons lasted,
tho more was the accent shifted to air
battles between land-based planes. The
Japanese air bases were located chiefly on
New Georgia, Bougaim'ille, and New Britllin;
the American oncs on the islands occ-upied
by them, in particular on Guadalcanal.
The air war reached its climax in the
air ba.ttles over Bougainville (November 5,
G, 11, 13, 17).
Although the advance of the Americans
into the wcstern Pacific has robbed the
fighting in the Solomons of 80me of its
actuality, taking place as it does far behind
the new main front, this fighting has by no
means ceWlC<1. According to American state-
ment,s, there are still some 22,000 Japanese
soldiers in the Solomons, principally on
Bougainville, constantly endeavoring to in-
terfere with the American operations. Up
to and including the last air battle
over Bougainville, the Americans, according
to official Japanese statements, suffered the
following losses:
SUlik
10 "ircraft carriers
12 battlC8hiplS
litJ cruisers
54 destroyers
Ii7 t.ran.Bporta
72 other units
NEW OUINEA.
Parallel to the spectacular battle for the
chain of the Solomon Islands, the outwardly
less exciting but no less grim battle for
New Guinea took place. In the course of
their victories during the first half of 1942,
the Japanese had occupied the island of
New Guinea, with the exception of its
southeastern part. They had crossed the
Owen Stanley range, which runs through
the length of Papua, and approached Port
Moresby, and had al80 landed troops in
Bona when, four weeks after the American
landing on Guada.lcanal, the Allied counter·
offensive on New Guinea began on Septem-
ber 2, 1942. Its first phase consisted of a
bitter struggle for Papua, conducted mainly
by Australian troops. In the course of this,
the Japanese, while inflicting serious 108808
on the Au%t.Ya.\ianll, slowly withdrew through
the mountL\ins and jungles of Papua north·
ward to the Huon Gulf. Not until soven
months after the beginning of the offensive
did the Allies cross the border of Papua,
on March 29, H143.
The almost inlpenetrable territory, part
of which had never been trodden by others
than natives, the unhealthy climate and,
above aU, tho stubbornness of the Japanese
resistance, which bore witness to the Japa-
nese ability in jungle fighting, Cllllsed the
Allied Command to change it.s tactics. The
original land offensive was supported in the
summer and autumn of 1943 by four land-
ings. The first of these took place in Nassau
Bay on June 30 (i.e., simultancously with
tho landing on Rendova) and led to con-
cerk"<.l action with the Australians advancing
from Wau. The second landing took place
on July 20 at Boishi, the third on September
4 at Hopai, 35 kilometers east of Lao, and
the fourth on September 22 northeast of
Finschhafen. These landings cost the
Americans considerable 1088C8 in ships, most
of which were inflicted upon them by land-
based Japanese planes. However, t.hey put
up with these losses, being intent upon
destroying the Japanese positions in Sala-
maua, Lao, and on the Finschhafen penin-
sula, in order to get the strait between New
Guinea and New Britain under their control.
In New Guinea, too, the air arm of both
opponents gained in importance as time
went on. In the late autumn of 1943 the
Japanese were faced by 80 large a material
superiority on the part of their enemies that
they had to withdraw their troops from the
Salamaua-Lae-Finschhafen sector northwest-
ward toward Madang. The rivers in that
pathless terrain representing important
routes of communication, the valleys of the
BUSli and Ramu Rivers were the scenes of
fierce fighting.
Toward the end of 1943 the local superi.
ority of the Allies had increased to such an
extent that they were able to progress from
the first phase of slow, step-by-step advance
to the second phase, which was characterized
by large landings and attempted landings in
the rear of the Japanese forces. It is, 80
to speak, the employment of the leapfrog
principle-which began simultaneously in
the other parts of the Pacific-Qn the north
coast of New Guinea. On January 2, 1944,
a landing was made at Cape Gumbi; on
April 22, protected by a strong air flct-t, at
Aitape and Hollandia; at the end of April
at Ulau; in the middle of May at the mouth
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of the Tor River; and on May 27 on Biak,
an island oII the north coast of New Guinea.
In the carrying out of these landings, the
Allies-for the most part American troops-
encountered stilI Japanese resistance and in
som cases 8uffured very considerable losses
in men and ships. The Aml'ricans had to
bring up and supply every single soldier by
sea, with the result that they lost nmnel"Ous
transports and warships.
The Allies haye still not succeeded in
breaking the Japanese resistance. The fight-
ing in New GUUICl\ is continuiJlg and, accord·
ing to US estimates, the Japanese forces
nre still some 9:3,000 strong. In that vast
and difficult territory-the island is about
two and a half tllUes bigger than Italy-the
Japanese will continue, in spite of being cut
otI fwm fresh supplies and material, to give
trou hIe to the Americans, thereby preventing
the Allies from consolidating their position
on Kew Guinea. This will not be without a
certain influence on the fighting in other
theaters, tho island haviJlg now gained
particular significance as a supply base in
t.he batLIe fOI' the Philippines.
On t.ho sonthwest C08.'lt of New Cuul0n the
Allies-in this case a combined Australian-
Dutch force--have, as far a,'l has become
known, made only a single large landing
attempt: at the mouths of the Lawrence amI
Eilanden Rivers in January ]!l44, probably
with the intention of stnrting a guerrilla war
in the Lnt,criol" of the island. However, the
.1apal1£'sp' succeeded in lLnniltihLting t.hiH
force within a month.
lH··~1.llWK ARCIDl'ELAGC AD)UR.u:ry IS.
During 1!).-l3 there were freq l1ent American
IItterances to the effect that the goal of
their Sol()Dlons as well as New Guinea
cam pttigns was the capture of the principal
JaplLnese base in this part of the Pacific,
Raballl on New Britain; and the Solomons
ami !\ow Guinea campaigns were called the
two jaws of the pincer closing in upon
Raballi. Hence, when the Americans had
achieved thciJ" purpose nl that pa,rl of New
Guinca which lies closest to New Britain bv
t.he IfLtc autumn of HH3, they crossed ov~r
to Kew Britain. On December 15 the"
h\ndcd at Cape Merkus and on Decemb~r
t6 at Cape Gloucester. At first the Japanese
resi tanoe limitcd the landed troops to com-
paratively small beachheads. Not until
Fobwary ]!H-! ditl they succeed in effectulg
a junction of the two forces. Nevertheless,
the Jl~panese resistance remained so effective
that the Americans have refrained from an
overland attack on Rabaul and contented
themselves with hell.vy bom bardments of
that town from the air as well as now and
again from the sea.
The second most important Japanese base
in the Bismarck Archipelago, Kavieng on
t.he northern tip of New Ireland, has hitherto
also been exposed to .<llnerican t~ttacks from
the air 01' from the sea. Finally, the Ameri·
cans decided to pass by Rabaul and Kavieng
and to attack the islands furt.her north and
northwest. On February 2H, 1!J4-4, they
began to occupy the Admiralty Islands,
t~nd on March 22 the St. M.atthias group.
The Japanese troops in the Bismarck Archi·
pelago are estimated by the Americans to
number 50,000. All in all, the Americans
reckon on some H37,OOO Japanese soldiers
continuing to fight bravely in the Solomons,
New Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago.
OLLB£.RT ISLAN os
Durulg their rupid advance in the first
half of 1H42, the Japanese had also seized
the Gilbert Islands. As this brought them
into dangerous proximity to the sea lane
betwoon HILwaii and Australia, the Amer-
icans were uel:lirous of forcing them out of
these islands again. On August 17, 1942,
the Americans llttempted a land.ing on
:Makin Island which. however. ended with
the annihilation of all land-iJlg troops.
Thereafter they contented themselves with
frequent bombarduH'l1t.s uf the Japanese
pOditions on the Gilbert Islands, at first
probably from the Phoenix Islands and
later from thcir newly acquired airfields on
the Solomons. Not until late in the autumn
of 1943 did they stage a la,rge-scale otfensive.
On November 111 a powerful American
naval unit begll.n to bombard the islands of
'l'afltwa and Makin. Aftor an intensive
preparat.ory barrage, anti supported by
II wuerous carrier-based planes, American
marines 1I1J1ded ulld were immediatelY in-
volved in heavy figbtllig with the numerically
weak Japanese garrison. On November 25
tlte remnants of the JI\paneSe defenders
made their last attack and, after having
intlicted severe losseR on the enemv. were
wiped out to the last man, like the ;rien on
Attll. As in the case of the Solomons, t.he
bat.tle for the Cilbert Islands was accom-
pallied by air battles (November 22, 2(;, 27,
:W). According to Japanese figures, the
capture of the Gilberts cost the Americans
20,000 men and 145 planes, all well all:
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THE MARIANAS
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Two months later the Americans got set
for the blow against the MarshaJl Islands.
Before that. they had carried out numerous
heavy air attacks on the largest islands of
the group. and in this way prepa."ed the
ground for the landings whieh began on
}'ehruary 1. 1944. In pursuance of their
new lcapfrog tactics. the Americ&D8 did not
land on the eastern but on the westernmost
islands of the group. viz .• first on Kwajalein
and ten days later on Eniwetok. passing by
the other Japanese island positions. in
particula.r Jaluit and Wotje. The sma.ll
number of Japanese defenders on both the
former islands offered heroic resistance until
they were wiped out after one week's fighting.
In the ensuing eleven months there were
frequcnt bombardments but no further
landings in the Mal'8halls. so that here. too.
there are considerable numbers of Japanese
still fighting in the rear of the Americ&D8.
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Compared to the fighting on the main
Pacifio war theater. that at the e~treme
wings in the far north and in the south was
of much smaller proportions. In the North
Pacific the Japanese had. during the first
period of the Pacifio War. extended their
sway to the American islands of At.tu and
Kiska. The AmeriC&D8 prepared their
counterattack by building air bases step by
step from Alaska westward through the
Aleutian lalands. and in January 1943 they
THE TWO WINOS
PALAU ISLANDS
Before the battle for the Marianas was
ended, fighting started for possession of the
Palau Islands, located on the route to the
Philippines. On September 15, 1944, the
Americans landed on Peleliu; ~ the 17th on
Angaur; and a little later on Koror. As we
go to press, the fighting on the Palau Is-
lands is still going 00.
planes and naval guns, part of the JapaneBe
}"'leet under the command of Admiral
Soemu Toyoda made the first large-scale
thrust against the American fleet after •
long interval. On June 19. planes based on
Japanese aircraft carriers attacked American
fleet units stationed in the waters between
the Philippines and the Marianas to cover
the landing on Saipan. According to Japa-
nese statements. five American aircraft car-
riera were sunk or damaged. one battleship
sunk. and 100 planes shot down. while
Japanese 1088e8 amounted to one ca.rrier,
two tankers. and 50 planes. During the
next five days the Americans l08t many more
units. but ~o actual naval battle took place.
Meanwhile. the Japanese garrison of Sai-
pan fought on un'daunted. On July 7 it
carried out a large-scale attack on the
American positions. Not until July 16,
when the last Japaneee defenders had fallen,
did the fightiJ}g come to an end.
Five days later, on July 21. the Americana
landed on Guam (Omiya). which island had
been subjected to frequent bombardments
in the preceding weeks. On July 23 followed
a landing on Tinian, from whoee airfields
the J apaneee had successfully interfered in
the fighting for Saipan. On both islands the
Americans met with stiff resistance on the
part of the Japanese garrison troops. There
are no exact data on the final battles on
both islands; the last Japanese defenders
probably fell on September 27.
DarMged
7 aircraft carriers
1 battleship
1 eruiaer
Sun!'
8 aircraft carriers
• erui.llers
1 destroyer
Immediately after the conclusion of fight-
ing on Kwajalein and Eniwetok. the Amer-
icanfl started large-scale bombardmcnts of
the .Japanese island positions adjoining to
thc west and northwest, especially of Ponape
and Truk in the Carolines. of Saipan in the
Marianas, of Marcus (Minamitori) and the
Bonin gronp (Ogasawara). The actual at-
tl\ck on the Marianas began on June 11.
1944. This marked the first appearance of
Task }"'orce 58, an American naval unit
commanded by Vice-Admiral Mitcher and
belonging to the Fifth Fleet under Admiral
Spruance. According to the US Navy
Department, Task Force 58 ill "the mightiest
and most destructive naval unit in the
history of naval warfare, capable of oarrying
its own fuel. provisions, and plane replace-
ments everywhere." It began its operations
with air attacks on Saipan. Guam, and
Tinian, lasting for three days. On June
15 the first landing attempt was made on
Saipan. This as well &8 the second one
were frustrated; the third one was successful
and led to a series of heavy battles. The
airfield of Oreai was the main battle center.
While Task Force 58 was occupied with
landing American troope on Saipan, with
supplying them and supporting them by
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Sunk
11 aircraft carriers
2 battleships
4 cruisers
included the island of Amchitka, 200 kilo·
meters BOutheast of Kiska, in their chain of
air baeea. As a result, the military activities
in this area up to the spring of 1943 were
mainly confined to fighting in the air with
occasional engagements at sea. FinaUy, on
May 11, 1943, the Americans landed on
Attu, and the ensuing battle h88 gone down
in history 88 the first of a number of to·the-
last-man-defenses of Japa.nese island garri.
800S in the Pacific. Descriptions of the
Attu battle publillhed by American eyewit-
nesses show the deep impression the behavior
of the Japanese defenders made on the
American troops.
On August 14, 1943, an American landing
took place on Kiska. However, unnoticed
by the Americans, this island had been
quietly evacuated by the Japanese.
Since then, no large engagements have
taken place in the stormy and fog-bound
North Pacific. However, tho American Air
.Foree has carried out frequent attacks on
the chain of the Chiahima Islands (Kurils),
particularly on the island of Paramushiro.
In the extreme southwest of the Pa.cific
war theater, in the labyrinth of the Indo-
nesian islands to the west of New Guinea,
development:e took a similar tum. Here,
too, the fighting was confined primarily to
the air, chara.cterized at first by frequent
Japanese attacks on northern Australia and
later by increasing Allied air raids on Indo-
nesia, designed partly to tie up JapanCtiC
forces at 0. considerable distance from the
main war theater and partly to(} prevent
Japanese reconstruction work in these areas.
The Moluccas, including Halmahera (Gilolo)
and Morotai, Ceram, Celebes, Flores, Java,
and Borneo (Balikpapan), have been favorite
targets. The first landiJlg operation in this
area occurred on September 15, 1944, on
MorotlLi, where fighting is still going on.
B.\TTLE OF." TAIWAS
Whatever the American plans in the
Pacific Olav have been, there can be no
doubt that~the strategical 'considerations in
Washington and Pearl Harbor were decisive-
ly influenced by Japan's victories in China,
i.e., the great, successes in South China. with
their destruction of numerous American air
bll8Cs, their advance on Kweilin nnd oc-
cupation of Foochow. The anxiety of losing
Chungki.ng l\l! an aUy 88 t.he result of further
neglect contributed toward a conference of
American naval commanders being hcld in
San Francisco on October 4. Among those
taking part were Admiral King, Commander
in Chief of the entire US Fleet; Admiral
Nimitz, the Commander in Chief of tho
Pacific Jo~leet; Admiral Spruance, Commander
of the Fifth (Central Pacific) Fleet, and
Admiral Halsey, in command of the Third
(Southwest Pacific) Fleet.
To judge by the events that have taken
place since then, an advance toward the
west was decided upon at this conference.
It was to be preceded by attacks on pointe
further north in order to divert the Japanese
and interrupt their routes of communication.
(This is the same strategy employed in the
attack on the Marianas, which was preceded
by attacks on the MarcUB and Bonin Islanda
further north.) Consequently, on October
9 a brief attack was made on Marcus Island;
on October 10 an air attack from carriers on
the Ryukyu Islands; and on October 12 on
Taiwan (Formosa).
Of the three attacks preceding the landing
on the Philippines, that on Taiwan was the
most important. Apparently it was intended
to decoy the greater part of the Japanese
forces to Taiwan in order to free the way
to the Philippines. On October 12, 1,000
planes from Task Force 58 appeared over
Taiwan. Further heavy attacks took place
on October 13 and 14. These were syn·
chronized with attacks of American heavy
bombers stationed in China; on· October 14
there were a hundred "Super Fortresses"
B 29 among the attacking planes. From
the evening of October 12, the Japanese
replied with ceaseless counterattacks against
the Task Force. Their aircraft stationed on
Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philip.
pines, among them many torpedo planes of
the Army which were employed for the first
tinIe, hurled themselves against the carriers,
regardless of the violent American defense.
Up to this point, the report-s from Tokyo
and Washington agree. But then they part
company. While Admiral Nimitz only ad·
mits damage to two medium-sized American
vessels and claims fantastic figures of Japa-
nese planes and ships destroyed at Taiwan,
Tokyo reports the following US 10BBeS in what
has been termed the "Air Battle off Taiwan":
Damaged
8 aircraft carriers
2 batl.lctlhip8
5 crui8eMl
13 other \"CilSCI.8
while Ja.panese losses amounted to only 312
plnnes and an undefined number of small
ships.
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Out of consideration for popular opinion,
Washington has already on several occasions
either not admitted US losses at all or only
admitted them bit by bit many months
later. Hence one may 888ume that, in view
of the proximity of the presidential election,
Washington could not make up its mind to
announce gigantic losses, preferring instead
to ignore the battle entirely.
There can be no doubt that Japanese
planes had the lion's share in the battle off
Taiwan, among them especially the torpedo
planes. The estimation of the role of the
Japanese Air }<"'orce in naval warfare has
undergone great fluctuations. After the
sinking of the Repulse and Prillce of Walu,
there were people who predicted the end of
the battleship. During the last year, on
the other hand, there were opinions to the
effect that the American antiaircraft defense
had been perfected to such a degree that
the Japanese air arm was done for. The
Taiwan battle has rehabilitated the Japa-
nese Air Force. To judge by its latest
succes8CS, it spent the last year training to
conquer the American antiaircraft defense
and has produced new tactics which came
as a surprise to the Americans. While the
Americans were capturing one island after
another last year, political and military
obacrvers were wondering what would hap-
pen when the US Fleet came close enough
to large Japanese air units operating from
land bases. The battle off Taiwan has
supplied the answer.
1'IlE PROSPECTS-AMERICAN VERSION
How the Americans themselves judge the
future s::c::pects in the war against Japan
was Btr' . gly formulated by a report i88ued
prior to the battle oft Taiwan by the Office
of War Information in Washington. It is
based on official data of the US Navy, War,
and State Departments. This report, de-
signed to counteract American overoptimism
and published throughout the USA, enumer·
ates the main difficulties facing the Amer.
icans in their war against Japan. The
following is the condensation:
(I) Japan is capable of increasing her production
of almOllt every kind of war e<Juipment,.
(2) Belore the Allies C8D IItrike against Japan,
they must have beaee c1011fJ to Ja~ proper. In
the Marianaa they are .till 1,500 miles from Japan.
(3) The p.-ent COUl'lMl of the war in China is
all in Japan'. favor, and the Allies have lost
valuable air buea there.
(4) Japan's army baa not yet been mustere<1
to full Arength.
(6) Japan baa at,(lred large strategio .uppliee in
Japan proper, Korea. and J4ancl1uria.
(6) Japan baa '-n conaerving air power which
she can now uae in greater concentration on the
narrowing theater of action. and her planes have
an increaaed firing power. range. and speed.
(7) Japan hu a powerful Reet.
(8) Japan operates on interior lines 01 .upply.
while the Allied .upply linea are becoming in.
creaeingly extended. It took more than two
year. to accumulate the quantities of.. war material
now baeed in Britain. The diatancea involved ill
the Pacific are three times ae great.
(9) Japan's Iu11 production is IJU1ftcient to main·
tain the populat.ion.
(10) Japan lItiIl bolde her major conqueete.
and tbe Allies lItill eannot attack her IIUpply rou"
along the China coaat except with long·ranae
.ubmarinee.
(II) Logilltio•• viz., the eyIItem 01 bringing the
right number 01 men to the right place with the
right equipment at the right time, is the chief
problem of the Allies in Pacifio warfare. The
lDvaaion of Northern France. the plana for which
were completely laid out ten montha in advance
of actual operationa. only involved a croaaing 01
1_ than 100 miles. In the Pacific. thoUll&l\dIJ of
milea muat be croMed. }'or thill. problema con.
cerning tranaporte, ClODV0)'ll. and loadina capacity
of American porta mUlJt be aolved. Landingll muat
be made in the face of lItift enemy oppoe1tion, often
on ahallow '-chell aeroae coral reefs, wbere there
are no porta of any kind. where aupplies must be
carried by hand, and where bad woather provell
very delltructive to military IIUpplies.
While the US Government is warning ita
people that the war ahead is long and
c08tly, the leaders of the Japanese nation
are also appealing to the people to gird
themselves for the great battles of the
immediate future. Japan has been preparing
for these battles with years of moral and
material armament and, during the last two
years particularly, by a vast expansion of
her air force. Both aides realize that the
decisive period of the war is approaching.
The battle for the Philippines which began
on October 17 may prove to be a curtain
raiser for the decillion.
'1'arapll,6
An American poratroop<>r on leave wa. &Sked how often he had jumped.
··Not once;' W88 the annrer, "but I wa. pushed out 17 timee!"
